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RESPONSE TO ERIC POSNER
Jean Braucher*
I am thankful to Eric Posner ("Posner") for helping me to
sharpen my own thinking. I agree with him and others that
bankruptcy is in part a law of hardship,' providing insurance
against financial distress, and that it is important to keep the cost of
this relief down. This is why I am interested in better means
testing, using means that do not burden even the clearest cases of
hardship. Most of those in the system are in bad financial shape.'
Let me stress that my praise for the current system is qualified.
Although better than that proposed in the pending legislation, the
current system is far from perfect. The pending legislation would
lead to less relief for true hardship and more failure in Chapter 13.2
Channeling people without the means to succeed into long
repayment plans is a problem under current law,' one that the
Roger Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers
College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 99 (1990) (summarizing the conventional justifications for bankruptcy as
humanitarian concerns combined with giving incentives to productivity);
Margaret A. Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1047, 1061-62 (explaining the goal of returning debtors to productive
economic participation). I do not agree with Posner that bankruptcy is a law to
"prevent" hardship; prevention requires such measures as financial education,
better job training, more ex ante consumer protection and a less porous social
safety net. When these measures are not taken or fail, bankruptcy ameliorates
hardship.
2 See, e.g., TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 61-71
(2000) (noting that one-third of debtors in bankruptcy are below the poverty line;
the median income of those in bankruptcy is half that of Americans in general,
and their median non-mortgage debt equals about a year's income).
3. Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of
Means, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 411 (concerning two-thirds failure
rate in Chapter 13 and likelihood that the proposed legislation would increase
failure).
4. Eric A. Posner, Should Debtors Be Forced into Chapter 13?, 32 Loy.
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"reforms" would make worse. The primary argument of my article
is that to achieve more accurate and realistic means testing without
burdening the needy, the bankruptcy system must be simplified.
My focus is on means of administration.
Posner states that the purpose of the proposed law is to make
bankruptcy more difficult,5 but the proponents do not admit that.
They do not say that their purpose is to make bankruptcy more
difficult for all, even the most clearly needy, so it is worth pointing
out this effect. (One of the techniques for burdening all filers is to
require their lawyers to investigate them, adding expense and
redefining the lawyer-client relationship; this is not about "sloppy"
lawyers, as Posner says.6)
Posner's main focus is on the moral terms of the debate,7 not a
new phenomenon. Bankruptcy debates have always been
conducted in moral terms.8 In the 1978 debates, creditors argued
for something they called "credit morality."9 In the current round,
a leading congressional proponent of the credit-industry package
built the case for the legislation on the claim that there is a new
"bankruptcy of convenience" "0 used by people with the means to
repay their debts. In my article, I draw on the work of many
L.A. L. REV. 965, 976 (1999). Posner has previously praised the idea of making
Chapter 13 "presumptive," but he did so without mentioning the high failure rate
in Chapter 13.
5. See Eric Posner, Comments on Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy by
Jean Braucher, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 457 (2002).
6. See id. at 459.
7. Id. at 457-58.
8. DAVID A SKEEL JR., DEBT'S DOMINION - A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA 191 (2001). Not so very long ago, debtors were imprisoned or
subjected to corporal punishment. See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment
for Debt and its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J.
LEGAL HIST. 153 (1982).
9. See SKEEL, supra note 8 (concerning creditors' campaign for "credit
morality," meaning the morality of repaying debts).
10. See Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 419
n.65 (quoting Congressman George Gekas); see also Bankruptcy and Abortion,
WALL ST. J., May 2, 2002, at A14 (urging, in an editorial, that the conference
committee to resolve differences over language to bar discharge of debts for
abortion clinic violence so that the legislation could be passed, and arguing, "This
isn't just an economic issue; it's also a moral one, promoting more personal
responsibility.").
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empirical scholars to criticize this claim on factual grounds.1 I do
not understand why it is "sterile," to use Posner's word, to care
about facts. The available evidence is that people who file in
bankruptcy today are in the same or worse financial condition as
they were in the past. 3 The reason for higher filing numbers is that
growth in consumer credit means more people are in debt trouble
and finding their way to the bankruptcy courts. If we really did
have a large number of people of means filing in bankruptcy, I
would support finding means to stop that.
Posner's distaste for moral argument is typical of a "law and
economics" approach. My own theoretical perspective is more one
of traditional political economy, recognizing the value of a mix of
market and democratic decision-making, without trying to
translate all policy concerns into economic terminology. The
worthwhile contribution of law and economics is to urge attention
to costs,6 but often- as with bankruptcy - the goals of law are not
merely to keep down costs.
Posner recognizes that a pure'7 market approach would not
work to price the value of the mandatory insurance for inability to
pay that bankruptcy law provides. He notes that one theory of
11. See Braucher, Means Testing, supra note 3, at Part II.
12. See Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No
Good, Book Review of The Fragile Middle Class: American in Debt, edited by
Teresa Sullivan et al.,, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 459 (2001) (discussing the problem
that more data will not change a closed mind).
13. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE
NExT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT 83 & n.124 (1997).
14. Id.
15. See Daniel McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 752 (1988) (arguing that economic terms are used to evoke a sense of
scientific power and to claim precision that is often illusory); see also Jean
Braucher, Toward a Broader Perspective on the Role of Economics in Legal
Policy Analysis: A Retrospective and an Agenda from Albert 0. Hirschman, 13 L.
SOC. INQUIRY 741 (1988) (concerning the need for a balance of market and
democratic decision-making), available at
http://www.law.arizona.edu/hibrary/LibraryInternet/library-info/resultsfacpubs.cf
m?MNULastName=Braucher&Offsett (last visited Apr. 2, 2002).
16. Braucher, supra note 15, at 770.
17. We already have partial market definition of the bankruptcy discharge, in
that consumers, by entering into secured credit contracts, make certain property
subject to secured creditors' claims despite the bankruptcy discharge.
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consumer bankruptcy law is "market failure" in insurance
markets." If the law were changed to permit debtors to waive the
bankruptcy discharge in loan contracts, only a small number of
consumers would read and understand the significance of such a
term, "9 and creditors would hardly wish to compete for those
consumers insisting upon non-waiver.0 An alternative form of
insurance for financial distress, our system of social safety nets, is
full of holes."
Once real markets are sensibly ruled out, as here, law and
economics scholars sometimes resort to the metaphor of a
"hypothetical market '' 2 or to cost-benefit analysis, and there are
elements of both approaches in Posner's comment. These
approaches do not avoid normative judgments, but they make
them less obvious and put them in terms less offensive to those
squeamish about morals.' Posner calls for balancing the benefit of
18. In this context, the term market failure takes in a number of problems -
including information costs (such as lack of information about one's own risk of
default), adverse selection, and debtors' cognitive and behavioral characteristics.
19. Sometimes shopping by a few may be sufficient to introduce market
competition. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets
for Contract Terms: The Example of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L.
REv. 1387, 1450 (1983) (noting that because firms cannot distinguish shoppers
from non-shoppers, non-shoppers benefit from the shoppers' efforts). But
creditors might be glad not to appeal to those shopping for credit that permits a
bankruptcy discharge.
20. This is a problem of adverse selection.
21. I agree with Posner that taxes and transfer payments are a better way to
deal with redistribution than legal rules such as bankruptcy law. Eric A. Posner,
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine,
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 283, 284 (1995); Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and
Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REv. 349, 383-84
(1988) (stating that contract rules are a crude, temporary and puny way to
redistribute wealth; taxes and transfer payments are a more precise, sustained
and significant means of redistribution). On the other hand, when we fail to
create an adequate safety net, the legal system is forced to cope.
22. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
23. See id. at 123 (noting that "conventional pieties" such as keeping
promises reduce the costs of policing markets); see also McCloskey, supra note
15.
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hardship relief against the impact on cost of credit,' but there are
several inevitable normative questions in doing so. One is what
constitutes a hardship case. Another is how to value the benefit
that hardship relief provides. The value of bankruptcy relief
cannot be precisely quantified;' it includes peace of mind and a
new incentive to the discharged debtor to be productive. Cost-
benefit calculations cannot mechanically tell us where to draw the
line on who gets relief and how much.
When it comes to legislative - as opposed to agency26 -
decisions, it strikes me as highly unrealistic to suggest that morality
be left out of debate. Creditors would be the last to suggest that
we stop thinking that about debt repayment in moral terms. Many
judgment-proof debtors are significantly motivated to repay loans
because they feel these debts are justly due. Collection agents
routinely and effectively use guilt to get people to pay. Erosion of
the sense of moral responsibility would have much greater impact
on the cost of credit than any tinkering with the bankruptcy laws.
Unfortunately, it is possible that a continuing flood of high risk
credit will wear down debtors' sense of obligation, and we ought to
worry about that. Morality reinforces the utilitarian concern with
costs.
The traditional morality about bankruptcy is that we ought to
reserve relief for the deserving - those without the means to pay,
and those who acted in good faith, if not with textbook prudence.
In short, relief is for the "honest but unfortunate,"' even if a little
foolish. Restricting relief in this way helps to keep down costs.
24. See Eric Posner, Comments, supra note 5, at 459.
25. A common problem in cost-benefit analysis is that benefits are harder to
measure than costs. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981).
26. Despite the limits of cost-benefit analysis, I have defended its use by
administrative agencies in the design of consumer protection regulation as a way
for regulators to keep in mind that their task is primarily to empathize with the
situation of consumers, thereby avoiding a more patronizing approach to
paternalism. See Braucher, supra note 21, 352-53, 421-26. Posner also defends
cost-benefit analysis as a way to discipline agencies. Eric A. Posner, Controlling
Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68
U. CHI. L. REv. 1137 (2001); Matthew A. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165 (1999).
27. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934).
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But more than a concern with costs is needed to decide who should
get how much benefit, obviously points on which there are multiple
views.
Finally, Posner overlooks the morally positive story for the
creditor and does not make use of the nuances of the unattractive
side. The credit industry is well aware of both. During the
bankruptcy "reform" campaign of the last few years, the industry
coalition put credit unions and conventional home loan bankers28
out front whenever they could find willing representatives.29 The
coalition never paraded a panel of payday lenders and title pawn
operators before the National Bankruptcy Review Commission or
a congressional committee. The industry tried to deflect attention
from declining underwriting standards and from less savory new
credit vehicles that have been part of the recent explosive growth
of consumer credit. Banished from view were those creditors
providing low-quality credit at very high rates and with predatory
foreclosure rates.3" Posner is aware that not all credit is of equal
social desirability.3 He has even been so bold as to defend usury
restrictions. 2 The need for bankruptcy has risen with increased
access by low-income persons to low quality credit.33 This is one
28. See IT'S WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946) (a movie in which Jimmy
Stewart plays a home loan banker with a heart of gold).
29. I witnessed this phenomenon when I attended a National Bankruptcy
Review Commission hearing.
30. A related point is that the consumers who get ahead financially are those
who distinguish between debt that improves personal finances in the long term
(debt incurred, for example, to get an education, increasing income, or to buy a
home, reducing housing expenses and building equity) and debt that only makes
one worse off (paying high interest for groceries or restaurant meals consumed
last month). Posner treats all consumer credit as equally desirable.
31. Eric Posner, Contract Law, supra note 21 (arguing for restrictive contract
doctrines to deal with the problem of "welfare opportunism" that leads to greater
credit risk-taking). This argument is odd; debtors' lack of social benefits
probably causes more credit risk-taking than having social benefits does.
Debtors often finance uninsured medical expenses or a period of unemployment,
without benefit of unemployment compensation, by using credit cards.
32 Id. I have given up on that.
33. Diane Ellis, Bank Trends - The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate
Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy
Rate (1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bankanalytical/bank/bt_9805.html
(last modified Aug. 13, 1999) (concerning unprecedented expansion in access to
RESPONSE TO ERIC POSNER
reason why access to bankruptcy should not now be made more
difficult. Another is that over-indebtedness in the United States is
not solely a result of the high default rates that inevitably come
with low quality credit; it is also a product of deficiencies in our
social safety net, leading to the self-financed safety net. As long as
we do not address these safety net problems, there will be honest
but unfortunate debtors in need of bankruptcy relief.'
high interest rate credit for low-income persons following interest rate
deregulation in the 1980s); see also Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The
Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking
System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in
Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000) (describing the problems consumers
get into with certain forms of low quality credit, such as payday and title pawn
loans).
34. See Eric Posner, Contract Law, supra note 21, at 295-96 (noting that it
would be better to use taxes and transfer payments to address these problems
rather than bankruptcy law).
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